Caste, Social Exclusion, and Opportunities for Education in Rural Punjab

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Preface

The Centre for Research in Economics and Business (CREB) was established in 2007 to conduct policy-oriented research with a rigorous academic perspective on key development issues facing Pakistan. In addition, CREB (i) facilitates and coordinates research by faculty at the Lahore School of Economics, (ii) hosts visiting international scholars undertaking research on Pakistan, and (iii) administers the Lahore School’s postgraduate program leading to the MPhil and PhD degrees.

An important goal of CREB is to promote public debate on policy issues through conferences, seminars, and publications. In this connection, CREB organizes the Lahore School’s Annual Conference on the Management of the Pakistan Economy, the proceedings of which are published in a special issue of the Lahore Journal of Economics.

The CREB Working Paper Series was initiated in 2008 to bring to a wider audience the research being carried out at the Centre. It is hoped that these papers will promote discussion on the subject and contribute to a better understanding of economic and business processes and development issues in Pakistan. Comments and feedback on these papers are welcome.
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Glossary

**Basti**  A settlement smaller than an established chak and usually located at its periphery.

**Biraderi**  Endogamous kinship group. Muslim castes use the term to refer to close relatives; Christians use it in the broader sense of their religious community (the Masih biraderi).

**Chak**  Village (in Punjabi), typically identified by a number or letter of the alphabet (e.g., Chak 38). This system was established during the expansion of canal irrigation under British colonial rule in Punjab.

**Kammi**  Pejorative term applied to nonagricultural castes in Punjab.

**Madrasah**  Seminary offering religious education, mainly focusing on the Quran.

**Nazim**  The equivalent of a mayor under the local government reforms initiated in 2001.

**Numberdar**  Hereditary position of the village headman (established during British colonial rule), who is responsible for village administrative matters.

**Panchayat**  Informal village-level body responsible for making decisions and resolving disputes. It usually comprises notables of the village or nominees of each disputant party.

**Tehsil**  Subdistrict: the second-lowest administrative division in Pakistan. Each tehsil comprises numerous union councils.

**Union council**  The lowest-tier elected body in Pakistan, consisting of 21 councilors and headed by a nazim.

**Zamindar**  Landowner
Abstract

Although caste-based social stratification and unequal access to educational opportunities coexist in several parts of South Asia, their interconnection remains underexplored in the context of Pakistan. This paper presents the key findings of qualitative case studies of three villages in central, southern, and northern Punjab.

Data based on interviews with a sample of 105 high- and low-caste parents of school-going children, school heads, and key informants reveal that caste-based social exclusion refracts into limited educational opportunities for low-caste children, especially if the household remains trapped in intergenerational poverty and is spatially excluded and stigmatized. On the other hand, these children’s access to education improves with greater socioeconomic openings or wider cross-caste bridging social capital rather than only intra-caste bonding social capital. The paper uses Amartya Sen’s typology of “active” and “passive” exclusion and “unfavorable inclusion” to explain the processes that limit lower castes’ access to and their self-deselection from educational opportunity. The findings are analyzed within Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical framework of social capital.
Caste, Social Exclusion, and Opportunities for Education in Rural Punjab

1. Introduction

As the 2015 deadline for achieving the Millennium Development Goals draws to a close, the challenge of persistent inequalities in access to education in South Asia—despite the growing number of schools—continues to confound policymakers and donors alike. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013, based on data (2005–2011) for 63 developing South Asian countries, finds that access to education is unequally distributed across urban and rural regions and social classes: the relatively poor are three times and rural children twice as likely to be out of school (United Nations, 2013, p. 15). This persistent disparity in educational access often coexists with high levels of social inequality, which, in this part of the world, are manifested in “categorizing collectivities” around religion, caste, tribe, language, region, and gender that define “outsiders” vis-à-vis “insiders” (Oommen, 1986, p. 53; Kabeer, 2006). Among these, caste is a powerful, socially stratifying factor that can intertwine with class, culture, ethnicity, religion, and language in complex ways, leading to the social exclusion of stigmatized groups across generations, in turn arresting their social mobility and access to resources (Kabeer, 2011).

A number of studies from the region suggest that higher poverty rates among socially excluded groups cannot be explained by their lower levels of assets and education alone (Kabeer, 2006). In India and Nepal, for example, Dalits have been historically excluded from land ownership and are concentrated in low-status occupations such as sweeping and garbage collection. Kabeer (2011) finds that 64 percent of the Dalit labor force and 50 percent of the Adivasi (tribal groups) labor force in rural India work as agricultural wage labor—one of the poorest paid occupations in the economy—compared with just 30 percent of other groups. She notes that this has led to highly “segmented labor markets” (p. 1).

Several quantitative studies in the context of India have shown that the caste, religion, and gender of teachers and students intersect with educational opportunity and learning outcomes (Borooah & Iyer, 2005;
Rawal & Kingdon, 2010; Dréze & Kingdon, 2001; Hoff & Pandey, 2004). It is argued that caste-based stratification may coexist with a tradition of not sending children to school and valuing child labor instead (Wazir, 2002). Research on rural India also indicates a substantial de facto level of caste-based segregation among schools due to the spatial segregation of castes, which leaves lower-caste children with poorly resourced schools (Kochar, 2008). While, in India, caste has attracted attention both in research and public policy debate on education, in Pakistan, its presence is often denied on the assumption of an Islamic “egalitarian” ideology (Gazdar, 2007).

Some in-depth ethnographic research has shown that, although Pakistan’s caste system is different from that of India, it persists in large parts of rural Punjab, setting off processes of social marginalization and exclusion for low-caste groups (Mohmand & Gazdar, 2007; Gazdar, 2007; Gazdar & Mallah, 2011; Alavi, 1971; Kabeer, 2006). Nevertheless, with the exception of two macro-level quantitative studies (see Jacoby & Mansuri, 2011; Karachiwalla, 2014) that offer somewhat conflicting results, the relationship between caste and educational opportunity remains largely unexplored in the Pakistani context.

This study contributes to the current literature by exploring the caste-based political economy of the social structures of three villages in southern, central, and northern Punjab. In doing so, we ask how caste-based stratification and social exclusion shape educational opportunities for the marginalized. We interpret social exclusion within Sen’s (2000) framework of the capability approach to human development, and evaluate educational equality within the space of capabilities, i.e., the range of effective educational opportunities and choices available to marginalized lower castes in relation to higher castes in the given context. The paper uses Sen’s typology of active, passive, and forcible inclusionary processes along with Bourdieu’s social critical theory to analyze and discuss its findings.

Section 2 presents an overview of the Pakistani context in relation to education and caste, with specific reference to Punjab. Sections 3 and 4 explain the study’s conceptual and theoretical framework and its methodology, respectively. Section 5 describes the selected case studies and Section 6 discusses their crosscutting themes. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the study’s key argument.
2. Background

This section provides a context for the study by describing the state of education, inequality, and caste-based exclusion in Pakistan, with special reference to Punjab.

2.1. Education and Inequality

Pakistan is a multicultural, multilingual country that faces widespread poverty and inequality. Currently, it ranks 146\textsuperscript{th} as per the Human Development Report for 2013, with an estimated 46 percent of its population living below the poverty line (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2013). The literacy rate is 58 percent (Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 2013) and seems to have made negligible progress over the last two years despite government efforts. According to the Education for All Global Monitoring Report for 2013, out of 775 million illiterate adults in the world, 50 million are from Pakistan, which makes this the third-highest illiteracy rate in the world.

Additionally, “horizontal inequalities” (Stewart, 2002) straddle Pakistan’s social landscape, resulting in the marginalization of certain groups. Using a multidimensional poverty index, Naveed and Islam (2010) find that poverty has spread across ethno-linguistic lines. An important dimension of such horizontal inequalities, specifically in rural areas, is caste (Alavi, 1971, 2001; Wakil, 1972; Mohmand & Gazdar, 2007).

Punjab is the country’s largest province and home to 55 percent of its population. The province has a substantial industrial and agrarian base, which accounts for around 58 percent of the national GDP. Thus, a change in development indicators in Punjab has a significant effect on weighted national indicators (UNDP, 2011). Although Punjab has the highest literacy rate among the provinces,\textsuperscript{1} the disparity between its urban (76 percent) and rural (53 percent) literacy rates has widened (Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 2013, p. 28).\textsuperscript{2} This is despite the fact that, in rural areas, 70 percent of all government schools and 35 percent of private schools are situated within a two-kilometer radius of villages (Punjab, Bureau of Statistics, 2008). Nevertheless, gender, regional, and rural–

\textsuperscript{1} The literacy rate is 60 percent overall, 70 percent among males, and 51 percent among females.

\textsuperscript{2} Based on data from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey for 2010/11.
urban disparities and high levels of inequality in schooling access and learning outcomes continue to disfigure Punjab’s education profile (see UNDP, 2011; Annual Status of Education Report, 2013; Andrabí et al., 2007).

2.2. Ascriptive Collectivity and Caste-Based Exclusion in Pakistan

Caste refers to a system of social organization that is closed and highly stratified, intersecting with class boundaries (Leach, 1971). Caste titles linked with the occupational division of labor across generations define the status of different caste groups in the hierarchy of the given social structure (Ghurye, 2008; Chokshi, 2014; Shah, 2004; Gazdar, 2007). Caste boundaries are carefully guarded through certain social practices, for example, endogamy, in order to maintain the distinction of the group (Oster & Wilson, 1978; Bhowmik, 1992). Thus, micro-level interaction enables the construction of macro-level social structures that discriminate or exclude individuals on the basis of their group membership (Kabeer, 2006; Ghurye, 2008).

This phenomenon of “ascriptive collectivity,” i.e., a mutually recognized social positioning ascribed to a certain group, affects the life chances of its constituent individuals (Daniel, 2014). We would argue that caste titles also indicate a “categorizing” of collectivities (Oommen, 1986) that may at times subsume or intersect with religious, tribal, racial, linguistic, and regional differences, thus distinguishing “outsiders” from “insiders” (p. 53).

While the caste system in Pakistan generally lacks the religious overtones and clear hierarchy that characterize Hindu castes, it is pervasive in certain regions, especially in rural areas (Alavi, 2001; Gazdar, 2007; Nazir, 1993; Gazdar & Mallah, 2011). In Pakistan, caste is translated as zaat, biraderi, or quom (kinship)—patrilineal groups bounded by endogamy (Mohmand & Gazdar, 2007, p. 3; Qadeer, 2006). These caste groups are associated with a hierarchical division of labor and occupational stratification (Nazir, 1993). Although in flux as a result of shifting market forces and education, in such a caste-bound system it is generally the group that bears the “rights to the direct source of livelihood” to which the individual is expected to conform (Nazir, 1993, p. 2899). Adherence to the group’s traditional authority and binding

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3 Oommen (1986) only mentions these categories along with caste; the argument that caste titles might denote or intersect with these differences is original.
norms is enforced by the very real threat of ostracism, given that the group is also a source of support for the individual (Wakil, 1972).

Gazdar (2007) points out the conflict between “public silence” and the “salience of caste [in Pakistan] in the working of labor markets and private dealings” (p. 87) by listing a number of kammi and menial labor castes—for example, the Muslim Sheikh, Choora, Masihi, Bheel, Lachhi, and Kohli castes in Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan—who remain relegated to poorly paid work and are marginalized because of their ascribed caste and traditional occupations. In certain cases, as Gazdar notes, the social exclusion they face is reminiscent of the severe caste-based stratification practiced by Brahmins in India, which comprises daily exclusionary practices of “untouchability” (refraining from eating or drinking with lower castes and not sharing utensils with them).

Caste also intersects with class and religion in a complex symbiosis that leads to discriminatory treatment, although it may not necessarily extend to the affluent among them. Gazdar (2007) argues that

Zaat, quom and caste remains perhaps the key dimension of economic, social and political interaction [...] The inequality is so severe and so deeply embedded in parts of the country that it is hardly even noticed (p. 87).

Alavi’s (2001) work on patron–client relationships reveals that local politics in rural areas are organized along lines of kinship and caste rather than class or ideology, resulting in differential access to public goods. Qadeer (2006) observes that caste is correlated with land ownership and the occupational specialization of high or low status, triggering multiple disadvantages for low-caste groups.

Gazdar and Mallah (2011) find that the “class/ caste nexus” plays an important role in maintaining class power and the hierarchical status between landowning and nonlandowning castes. They argue that the government’s scheme of allocating land to noncultivators in the 1970s did not achieve the desired results because the original (high-caste) landowners had the power to evict anyone from the village. Since political and economic changes have failed to address the basic institutions that constitute inequality, any degree of outreach to the poorest lower castes remains an illusion.
Mohmand and Gazdar (2007) study a sample of seven villages across Punjab and find that caste is a salient feature of village life, limiting the access of certain groups to livelihood options, social services, and political empowerment (p. 3). The concentration of land among certain castes through social practices—for example, endogamy and preventing the sale of land outside the immediate family or caste group—results in low social mobility and serves to maintain the economic dependence of lower castes on higher castes. The authors argue that this economic dependence “translates very easily into political control of the village community” (p. 4). As a result, the key decision-making body within a village always comprises high-caste members (p. 4). Even when no single caste is dominant, for example in the case of Chakwal, castes that have been historically marginalized in rural Punjab (primarily the occupational landless castes) are still at a disadvantage (p. 7).

Empirical research on education in this context is severely limited, with only two existing studies to our knowledge. Jacoby and Mansuri’s (2011) study, based on the Pakistan Rural Household Survey II dataset, reveals that school enrollment among low-caste girls remains lower if they have to “cross boundaries” to attend school in higher-caste settlements. Thus, low-caste children are deterred from enrolling when the most convenient school is in a hamlet dominated by high-caste households. The results show that low-caste girls benefit in terms of access to schooling when the school is also caste-concordant.

Karachiwalla (2014) uses the longitudinal dataset generated by the Learning and Educational Achievement in Pakistan Schools (LEAPS) project and, unlike previous studies (for example, Rawal & Kingdon, 2010), argues that high-caste teachers have a positive impact on learning outcomes among low-caste boys. Her results are far from conclusive, however, as the study’s comparisons are not consistent across gender or high- and low-caste-dominant villages. In addition, instead of three caste-type tiers as identified in the literature (see Mohmand & Gazdar, 2007), the term “low-caste” is used to describe both service castes (skilled labor) as well as menial labor castes (unskilled labor). Considering that the skilled labor castes in rural Punjab are far better off than the menial labor castes, which are stranded on the lowest rung of the social order, Karachiwalla’s (2014) findings may mask the issues confronting the most marginalized castes. The author herself admits that the mechanism cannot be proven directly in this data and that the results are not definitive.
2.3. Caste in Punjab

Castes in rural Punjab can be divided into three categories: (i) landowning cultivator castes, (ii) artisans and service castes, and (iii) landless agricultural laborers or menial labor castes, with the latter two often referred to as “kammis” (Mohmand & Gazdar, 2007, p. 3; Qadeer, 2006). Traditionally, landownership is a key distinguishing feature of the higher castes, although acquiring land in itself does not automatically ensure rank (Nazir, 1993; p. 2900).

Landholdings in rural Punjab remain largely caste-based, with roots in the Punjab Land Alienation Act 1900 and the Punjab Pre-Emption Act 1991 (Cassan, 2011), which restricted the transfer of land from agricultural to nonagricultural castes. The zamindari (landownership) system introduced by the British in 1793 as the “permanent settlement of land” dissolved collective landownership in villages, thereby funneling caste into class dimensions (Mukherjee, 1999, p. 1759; Thorat & Newman, 2007). These social exclusionary processes were “naturalized” in the form of tradition and culture (Das, 2006) across economic, political, spatial, and cultural planes (Kabeer, 2011).

3. Theoretical Framework

In this study, we conceptualize social exclusion in terms of the limited opportunities and access to economic, political, and social resources associated with membership of certain culturally defined and stigmatized groups (Thorat & Newman, 2007). Social exclusion is understood as being embedded in the political economy of social relationships across groups and is context-bound and multidimensional (Kabeer, 2006).

We use the criteria set by Mohmand and Gazdar (2007, p. 19) to identify social exclusion in the given context. These include: (i) landlessness or lack of access to the main resource, (ii) unemployment, (iii) income poverty, (iv) violence and crime, (v) political disempowerment, (vi) poor and segregated housing conditions, (vii) lack of healthcare, (viii) lack of education and educational facilities, and (ix) lack of other services such as electricity, gas, sanitation, water, and roads.
3.1. A Framework of Social Exclusion and Capability Deprivation

The concept of social exclusion is positioned within the broader framework of Sen’s capability approach to human development. This allows us to provide a firm theoretical and historical foundation to the study that can be traced back to Marx, Smith, and Aristotle. The capability approach emphasizes a needs-based distribution of resources while drawing attention to the fact that human needs are essentially diverse. It also distinguishes between the means and the ends: it argues that the end of all development is human wellbeing, while commodities and resources are only a means to that end (Sen, 1990).

This distinction is crucial to highlight that the provision of equal resources may not necessarily lead to equal outcomes because of the difference in the social and cultural contexts of individuals. This diversity of contexts can lead to different conversions and uses of the same resource. For example, the provision of the same textbooks in one school will not translate into equal learning outcomes if some students do not understand the language used in the textbooks. Similarly, the provision of schools will not help all children when some children are culturally debarred from attending school.

Thus, the capability approach evaluates equality in terms of “capabilities,” i.e., the freedom of choice and the range of effective opportunities made available to individuals to achieve what they have reason to value (Sen, 1990). From this perspective, poverty is seen as relative and conceptualized as “capability deprivation” or the lack of freedom to achieve valued goals (Sen, 2000, p. 5) rather than as merely the lack of resources (although the latter also needs to be taken into account).

Social exclusion crystallizes the relational dimension of capabilities and is related to capability deprivation in two ways. First, insofar as the sense of belonging to a society is inherently valuable to human beings, social exclusion constitutes capability deprivation when it divests individuals of this valued identity (Sen, 2000). Deprivation of the capability to “appear in public without shame” (Smith, 1776, cited in Sen 2000) is, therefore, rooted in absolute poverty.

Second, social exclusion is instrumental to other capability failures because limited participation can exacerbate deprivation by circumscribing access to information and resources. The concept of social
exclusion draws attention to the context by projecting individuals as bounded by the social structures in which they are situated, thereby highlighting the horizontal “concentration of disadvantage” and the “polarization of haves and have-nots” (Bynner & Parsons, 2002, p. 290). Nevertheless, while retaining its focus on “capabilities,” the approach also takes into account the distribution of resources and equality of “functionings,” i.e., the current state of participants’ standard of living or their “beings and doings” (Sen, 1990). This constructs a relative, complex estimation of wellbeing.

Following Sen (2000), we differentiate between “active” social exclusion (i.e., when social policies are deliberately designed to exclude certain groups) and “passive” social exclusion (which occurs only as an unintended outcome of a social structural change or policy). In addition, the concept of social exclusion is also understood to cover “unfavorable inclusion” or “exploitative relationships,” i.e., when people are forced to be part of social interaction that is biased toward privileging the dominant (Sen, 2000, p. 29). We extend its meaning here to encompass enforced intra-group norms that limit the freedom of individuals and restrict them from achieving their valued goals, which leads to the formation of “ethnic enclaves” (Xie & Gough, 2011). Social exclusion can then manifest itself in segregation, marginalization, and discrimination.

### 3.2. Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Capital in Proximity to Social Exclusion

We complement the concept of social exclusion as embedded in the capability approach framework with Bourdieu’s theoretical toolkit of “social capital.” Sen’s approach is only an evaluative framework: while it explains the processes of social exclusion, it stops short of explaining the causes. Positioning the concepts of social capital and exclusion “in dialogue” (Daly & Silver, 2008) enhances the study’s analytical focus and sharpens its explanatory power. However, our discussion keeps in mind and maintains the operational distinctions between the two as well as their divergent agendas.

Bourdieu’s (1986) theoretical concept of social capital is inherently class-based and exclusionary. It resembles the concept of social exclusion offered by the capability approach and explains the underlying exclusionary mechanisms. Developing a link between social capital and social exclusion, Bourdieu (1993) describes social space as being
hierarchically structured, where people are positioned in relation to the volume and composition of their capital. These forms of capital—economic, cultural, and social—are interlinked with one generating the other. However, it is economic capital, institutionalized mainly through property rights, that lies at the core of all other forms of capital and generates the same or expanded volumes of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Since these other forms are not only a transubstantiation of economic capital, but are also transformable into economic capital, they help reproduce the relational position of different individuals or groups in the social structure.

Social capital is a “network of relationships” that stabilizes over time and is often institutionalized through the allocation of titles. At the group level, these titles (for example, caste) work to create a mutual understanding of the social positioning of different groups. They demarcate the social distances that need to be maintained within and across groups, along with an entire set of obligations and expectations that need to be observed in social interaction (Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu (1993) argues that the capital generated within a group is inherently exclusionary and ascribed titles such as caste provide differential entitlements of the group in relation to others. This affects the objective or perceived opportunities of the individuals who comprise the group and their differential access to resources (Bourdieu, 1986).

We would argue that titles also work as a repository of collective memory that serve as gatekeepers of group boundaries and maintain the “distinction” of the group in ways that mere class-based stratification cannot. The resulting group solidarity allows “scattered agents” to act and speak and be viewed by others as “one,” although at times a subgroup known to all people comes to represent the whole group (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 12). This makes social capital an important mechanism of domination and exclusion and is “key to understanding the strategic usage of different types of resources in the context of hierarchically organized social life” (Daly & Silver, 2008, p. 541). However, rather than being static, social capital is essentially dynamic and group boundaries have to be constantly reaffirmed and “enacted” through the difference between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” practices and “exchange rituals” (Maton, 2005). Endogamy is one such ritual that ensures social closure.

Individual choices are affected by the resource of social capital available to individuals. Individuals are socialized within their social groups into certain
worldviews, thus accepting and internalizing as personal the group’s external social boundaries (Wacquant, 2007). This makes them perceive and make choices similar to those of their group. Their socialized self, in turn, controls and reproduces inter-group inequalities in individual choices. However, this is an evolving process affected by exposure to different fields, types of social capital, and changes in market structure, all of which can change the perceptions and choices of the whole group over time.

We adapt Bourdieu’s construct of social capital by differentiating between “bonding” social capital—the horizontal interaction and relations within a group that denote strong bonds of belonging—and “bridging” social capital, which represents the crosscutting ties among different groups (Putnam 1998; Putnam, 2001; Narayan 1999; Woolcock, 1998, cited in Stone, 2003). This enables us to explain how access to different types of social capital leads to social exclusion or inclusion and its relative impact on educational opportunity.

The differentiation also allows us to argue that not all social capital is good. For example, bonding social capital may safeguard the “distinction” of the elite (Bourdieu, 1986), but among lower castes, result in “unfavorable inclusion” (Sen, 2000); this imposes certain group values and norms on individuals, thereby foreclosing opportunities for their wider social participation. Bridging capital, however, can lead to wider integration and expanded opportunities.

3.3. Applying Sen and Bourdieu’s Framework to Educational Opportunity

Applying this integrated framework to educational opportunity in the hierarchal social space of a rural setting would mean the following:

- The choices of individual households regarding their children’s schooling will be similar to those positioned likewise in that particular social setting.

- The more the segregated and socially excluded the group, the stronger will be the bonding capital that enacts itself in the “unfavorable inclusion” of individuals, controlling their choices. If persistent over time, this will also lead to “self-deselection” by the group from educational opportunity once their self-positioning is naturalized.

- The more bridging capital there is, the greater the chances that all households will send their children to school, even when it is difficult
to afford. This is because the norms of the dominant group regarding the value attached to education will be accepted and emulated.

- Since economic capital underlies social capital, the more market opportunities there will be and the more social structures will loosen their grip, weakening the dominance of historically privileged groups. This could either (i) lead people to reject the dominant group’s norms as a form of resistance, e.g., to reject education if the exclusion is severe and spatial, or (ii) generate bridging social capital, leading people to conceptualize the value of education. Eventually, such responses will be guided by the perceived return on education in the market structure.

- Since bonding social capital is exclusionary, the struggle to control resources will be important and the privileged are likely to ensure that schools are located close to where they live or have access to expanded opportunities.

Schooling itself can serve to reproduce the given social structure (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977) because schools are not insulated from wider social prejudices. This becomes evident when:

- Different types of education are provided across classes, thereby excluding the dominated from the kind of education to which the privileged have access.

- Schooling structures are aligned to pedagogical practices that privilege the dominant and reinforce their social position.

- Wider social prejudices are reflected in pedagogical practices, academic judgments, and ability-based labeling. Students from poorer backgrounds will be given to believe that they are naturally incompetent (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977), eventually leading them to self-deselect from the educational process or drop out altogether as a result of “delayed elimination.”

4. Research Design

Based on a multiple-case-study design, we explore the political economy of social structures in three selected villages with reference to caste and its impact on the perceived opportunities for education available to disadvantaged groups. Each village is treated as a unique case study. The methodology used is qualitative, our aim being not to generalize findings
across areas, but rather to understand in depth the possible ways in which caste might intersect with educational opportunities for lower castes.

4.1. Sampling

The three villages selected are among those included in the Privatization in Education Research Initiative (PERI) dataset for 2011. The data, which was drawn from the randomly selected Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey for 2007/08, represents 16 households in each village.

The sampling frame was geographically stratified into villages in southern, northern, and central Punjab. The PERI data was then used to purposively select three villages from each geographic area based on two criteria: (i) the largest complexity of caste and religion, and (ii) the lowest school enrollment. Accordingly, the selected villages fall within the district of Bahawalpur to the south, Faisalabad in central Punjab, and Chakwal to the north.

For each village, we used the PERI dataset to select eight households representing a dominant caste in a powerful position, based on their landholdings and household assets; this was subsequently verified through interviews with key informants and focus groups. Similarly, eight low-caste, low-income households were selected to develop a relational understanding of social position and educational opportunity in each village.

In cases where the key informant interviews revealed the presence of other castes of interest that were not part of the PERI sampling frame, these were added to the sample while conforming strictly to the decided number. Two criteria set by Mohmand and Gazdar (2007) were used at this stage to distinguish between high and low castes: landownership and income poverty. The services or occupational castes positioned in between the two were not part of the study. An additional criterion for the selection of specific households was the presence of a child of school-going age (10–16 years old). This was to ensure that households had undertaken some decision-making regarding their children’s schooling.

4.2. Methods

Data collection methods included both questionnaires as well as structured interviews. The questionnaires were used to record demographical data and quantitative information based on the
dimensions of social exclusion suggested by Mohmand and Gazdar (2007) to estimate relative differences in “achieved functionings,” (Sen, 1990) and the extent of social exclusion. The interviews aimed to capture the impact of social structures on household decision-making in relation to children’s schooling and perceptions of educational opportunity. Both parents were interviewed in each household, if available. Thus, a total of 96 household interviews were conducted across the three villages, in addition to six interviews with the heads of private and government schools in each village.

Six focus group interviews were conducted with key informants—primarily from the elite—in each village. This was done deliberately because we felt that the dominant group’s discourse reflected the common parlance of power and this was crucial to understanding the social hierarchies and political economy of the village. In accordance with the cultural tradition of gender segregation, three male and three female groups were formed.

Each focus group comprised a minimum of four individuals selected on the basis of three criteria: (i) their caste-based high social rank, (ii) their political position or role within the social structure of the village, and (iii) their level of education (beyond secondary school). Similar criteria were applied to women. Given their limited public participation, however, women married to politically important high-caste men were also deemed suitable focus group members.

4.3. Analysis

The data was analyzed in two different ways. First, the quantifiable data gleaned from the interviews was coded and analyzed using STATA 12. The qualitative data was transcribed and each interview individually coded line by line. Detailed matrices were then developed, using broad descriptive codes such as “positioning of the self and others” and “educational provision and choices” as patterns began to emerge across the interviews.

Axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) was used to create a higher level of abstraction in the themes that emerged across the data. In the last instance, themes across all three cases were compared and categorized as active exclusion, passive exclusion, or unfavorable inclusion (Sen, 2000). Subsequently, we also applied the theoretical frameworks developed by

5. **Village Case Studies**

The three case studies include: (i) Chak 38/JB in Faisalabad, (ii) Chak 38/BC in Bahawalpur, and (iii) Jhatla in Chakwal.

5.1. **Faisalabad**

The village of Chak 38/JB, known locally as Dogora, is located in the relatively prosperous district of Faisalabad in central Punjab. The district has a private school participation rate of 22.7 percent and a public school participation rate of 50.8 percent for students aged 11–15 years (Raju & Nguyen, 2014).

5.1.1. **Village Location and Resources**

Dogora has a population of approximately 7,000 persons, making it the smallest of the three villages in our sample. The village lies near the main highway to Faisalabad city and is easily accessible by public transport. Agriculture forms the primary occupation and there is no major industry in the vicinity. Most households have access to electricity, but the village has no gas connections and residents rely on firewood or gas cylinders for cooking. The village also has a rural health center that offers basic medical facilities.

5.1.2. **Caste Composition and Social Structures**

The majority of village residents are Sunni Muslims, although there is also a large Shia minority. Both sects are found across all the major caste groups. Dogora also has a small Christian (Masihi) population of less than a dozen households clustered together. There is a strong distinction between landowning and nonlandowning castes in Dogora.

Most of the landowning higher castes had migrated from East Punjab after Partition in 1947 and been awarded land by the Pakistani government or acquired agricultural land early on. These include the Kamboh, Rajput, Gujjar, Arain, and Jatt castes, which represent the dominant castes in Dogora. Their agricultural landholdings are, however, smaller than those in the case-study village in Bahawalpur, and the most prosperous
households are those that have diversified their economic interests, have family members working abroad, or have other sources of income.

The nonlandowning castes include a range of groups: the Muslim Sheikh (referred to pejoratively as “Mussalis” in the village), the Masihi (Christian), Badu, Faqir, Machhi, Ansari, and the nomadic Phuwar or Qalandar castes. They do not own any agricultural land and a majority do not even have any legal papers securing ownership of their residence. Although occupations and income levels vary somewhat, the most common types of employment are agricultural or other forms of menial labor (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Caste and occupation: Dogora, Faisalabad

The poorest lower castes, such as the Muslim Sheikh, Badu, and Qalandar, are generally engaged in part-time low-paid jobs, for example, looking after other people’s livestock or seasonal agricultural employment. Endogamy is widely practiced among all the castes in the village. The only exceptions are the Masihi, who will marry outside their own subcaste but only within their religious community.

Such castes are socially and spatially marginalized: they live on the periphery of the village in a locale known as the izafi basti (subsidiary settlement). The settlement is some distance from the main village and is connected by a narrow dirt road. Lower castes such as the Muslim Sheikh and Badu reside in mud houses, while the Qalandar—who self-identify as the Phuwar but are referred to by the village as Qalandar—are
traditionally nomadic and live in makeshift tents. Although the Qalandar claim to have lived in Dogora for over 16 years, they have not achieved social acceptance and are still viewed as “outsiders” by the other castes we interviewed. Several of them are beggars by occupation.

5.1.3. Social Relations and Power Structures

The dominant higher castes are the Kamboh, Rajput, Arain, and Gujjar; there is evidently some level of intra-group equality among these castes, based on landownership, but their socioeconomic conditions tend to vary. The permanent members of the panchayat (the local decision-making authority in the village) also belong to one or other of these castes, including the numberdar. The low castes, which include the Ansari, Faqir, Badu, Masihi, and Machhi, have limited political or social influence in the village. None of them play any role in the village-level or local bodies, for example, the union council. Moreover, none of them receive any government funds or have bank accounts or access to loans.

The informal village panchayats are the main mechanism through which all castes resolve their disputes, with each party nominating a representative—typically an elder or notable from within their caste—to act as mediator. In addition to the panchayats, the lower castes report seeking mediation and support from the numberdar to help resolve disputes. Clearly, the higher castes wield considerable authority in the village. The high-caste Shia households, however, rely significantly on members of their own religious community to resolve issues and for support.

5.1.4. Educational Opportunity

There are two public schools in Dogora—one each for boys and girls—and several private schools, one of which is till Grade 12. There is also another girls’ high school in the neighboring village, which is easily accessible from Dogora. The private schools offer far better facilities and infrastructure than the public schools, but tuition costs around PRs 400 a month, making these school affordable only for the better off. The public schools are poorly resourced and under-staffed, with dilapidated buildings. Classes are taught primarily in Punjabi and Urdu, although the textbooks are in Urdu. Some of the higher castes reported sending their sons to public schools and their daughters to private schools.
The public schools charge a nominal tuition fee (PRs 20 per month) and cater primarily to the lower castes and service castes. The higher castes send their children mainly to private schools. The low-caste respondents we interviewed complain that the quality of education at the public schools was inferior to that of the private schools. Faqir, Badu, and Muslim Sheikh caste members report sending their children to public schools (Figure 2). However, children who had complained of mistreatment by their peers and teachers had refused to attend school any longer.

Figure 2: Caste and schooling choices: Dogora, Faisalabad

Many households clearly prefer sending their sons (rather than their daughters) to school, and almost all the respondents report that their children tend to drop out before completing secondary school in order to help support the family. None of their daughters are enrolled in school, with poverty cited as the main reason. If funds do become available, low-caste parents are more likely to send their sons to school. The Qalandar, however, traditionally do not send their children to school at all. Notably, all the schools in Dogora are situated at a distance from the basti or from other spatially segregated lower castes.

5.2. Bahawalpur

The district of Bahawalpur lies to the south of Punjab. It has a lower literacy rate (45 percent) than either Faisalabad (66 percent) or Chakwal (72 percent) (Punjab, Bureau of Statistics, 2011). The percentage of children (aged 5–9) attending primary or secondary school is, again,
lower for Bahawalpur at 43.4 percent than for Punjab overall (52.9 percent). Most people in the district are Seraiki-speaking although Punjabi is widely spoken in some areas too. Locals generally feel that the Punjabi-speaking communities are more affluent and better represented in the local government and political spheres.

5.2.1. Village Location and Resources

Chak 38/BC is situated northwest of Bahawalpur and has a population of approximately 15,000 persons. It is a 25-minute drive from the city of Bahawalpur and neighbors the district of Khairpur. The village has access to electricity but not to gas. There is a rural health center that delivers basic services. The village is divided by an intersecting main road or thoroughfare known as the “adda,” which is not considered part of the village itself. This is fringed by a number of privately run schools, medical stores, private clinics, and a number of shops.

The two parts of the village differ in terms of their historical evolvement, physical layout, and caste composition. The older part of the village, which is known as the Old Chak, comprises vast areas of agricultural land and large, mostly well-constructed houses along wide, clean streets. It also has access to clean drinking water. The newer part of the village on the other side of the adda is known as Basti Bilalnagar. Its population surged in 1988 when a large number of flood-affected persons from different parts of the country came here to settle down.

Basti Bilalnagar comprises semi-urban slums of dilapidated brick houses built close together. Its streets are narrow and polluted, and lined by overflowing drains where barefoot half-naked children are often seen to play. The water here is brackish and potable drinking water has to be drawn manually from a water pump in the Old Chak and carried back. The better off have their water delivered, while others do it themselves or leave it to their women and children.

5.2.2. Caste Composition and Social Structures

The village has a majority Muslim Sunni population, with only a few Shia households clustered together on either side of the village. A small community of Christian Mashi also resides in Bilalnagar. The Old Chak is dominated by affluent, landowning Punjabi-speaking Jatts and their subcastes, of which the dominant majority are Goraya. The Jatt emphasize
that they are the oldest settlers here, having acquired lands from the British during the colonial period. Hence, their claim to ownership—“this village is of the Jatt and Goraya”—can be well understood. The other Jatt subcastes settled here—the Cheema, Deol, and Kahloon—are also landowners.

Basti Bilan Nagar is composed of heterogeneous castes that clearly hold a lower socioeconomic position than the Jatt in the Old Chak, although their hierarchy is less defined. There are some Jatt households here, along with other landowning castes such as the Seraiki-speaking Baloch, Buhar, Luther, Wadd, Syed, and Arain. The large majority, however, belong to the poorer kammi or menial labor castes—the Lohar, Nai, Taili, Jollahay, Machhi, Mirzada, Jam, Taheem, Paoli, and Masihi—who were traditionally involved in manual labor or depend on the old Chak for employment (Figure 3). However, a gradual shift is visible in their interrelationship with the Old Chak, which means they have now become less dependent on the landowning castes for their livelihood.

### Figure 3: Caste and occupation: Chak 38/BC, Bahawalpur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kambob</td>
<td>Skilled labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jam</td>
<td>Unskilled labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masihi</td>
<td>Cultivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirzada</td>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatt</td>
<td>Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syed</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Its proximity to the main road has opened up new opportunities for employment in this part of the village, which has acquired a peri-urban status. Traditionally, the Masihi have also engaged in menial labor, but there are now signs of occupational mobility among their younger generation, which has progressed upward from more menial jobs. The Seraiki are generally seen as the poorest and the “Punjabis” as the richest, across the village.
Landownership is a strong mark of identity and the Jatt sometimes define their caste as *zaminadar* although landownership alone is not enough to ensure power. The Arain, for example, are landowners and nonetheless subject to marginalization by the Punjabi-speaking castes, given their traditional rivalry. Similarly, in the Old Chak, the Jatt discriminate more severely against the Chishti caste (who are both Shia and Seraiki) than against the Christian community. Nevertheless, the Shia/Syed residents of Bilalnagar are tolerated better because it is a more heterogeneous locale.

5.2.3. **Power Structures**

The social dominance of the Jatt is entrenched not only in their traditional economic position and near-exclusive claim to vast agricultural lands, but also in their political position. The Jatt in Chak 38/BC are proud of their *numberdari* (their claim to the position of village head). Normally, there is one numberdar per village, but this village is large enough to warrant two. Thus, the Jatt share the numberdari with the Sahu, another landowning caste settled in Basti Bilalnagar.

The Jatt subcaste, the Goraya, hold important positions in the *tehsil*-level government. Within the village, the Jatt also dominate the panchayat: all five permanent members of the panchayat are Jatt, and people might also approach them individually to resolve their disputes. Even in the few cases where people have resorted to the local police in defiance of a panchayat-issued decree, the Jatt are influential enough to have the complaint dismissed. None of the nonlandowning castes are members of the panchayat or hold any political office. Although all the survey participants in the Old Chak have national identity cards, it is the dominant Jatt who tend to sway voting decisions.

In Bilalnagar, however, the Jatt-led panchayat has little influence. Although the Jatt numberdar has built a house here to maintain his political hold, only half the survey participants reported referring to the panchayat to resolve their disputes. Instead, they turn to their own biraderis and elders or resort to the police. This could mean that, in Basti Bilalnagar, there is greater opportunity for the lower castes to make their own decisions.

Many households in Bilalnagar rely on the Benazir Income Support Program. In addition, several Masihi and Mirzada households have been
able to obtain personal bank loans to meet their private needs—unlike the Jatt, who are able to access loans to expand their agricultural production.

5.2.4. Educational Opportunity

There are only two schools in the Old Chak: a government girls’ high school (with a primary section) and a private primary coeducational school. Bilalnagar has two government schools: a higher secondary school for boys and a middle (up to Grade 8) school for girls (spread over 10 acres).

The general perception is that the influential castes in the Old Chak have not allowed the girls’ middle school in Bilalnagar to be upgraded, focusing instead on the government girls’ school in their own locale. This means that girls living in Bilalnagar and the surrounding villages have to travel farther to attend high school, which has led to some dropping out of school. There are also a number of private primary schools along the adda.

It is worth noting that the boundaries of the adda and Bilalnagar are contested by village residents on either side. Geographically, the boys’ school falls within Bilalnagar, but the higher castes in the Old Chak insist that it falls along the adda. Similarly, people in Bilalnagar claim that the private schools fall within their locale, although more of these seem to be located on the adda. The private schools charge PRs 150–1,500 a month in tuition. While the government schools are generally free, a nominal sum (PRs 20) and a computer fee (PRs 30) are charged every month, along with an examination fee (PRs 250). Textbooks are provided free of cost.

The facilities in these schools leave much to be desired in terms of the provision of libraries and computers, although the teachers are generally better qualified (BA, MA, and MEd) than those in private schools. Paradoxically, the consensus is that the government schools here do not perform well at the primary level, with consistent complaints about the increasing demand for funds, teacher absenteeism, and the poor quality of teaching and learning.

Enrollment levels in the Old Chak are high: the Jatt appear to value education and are even willing to send their daughters to college in Bahawalpur, where they live in hostels. Additionally, they often support their children’s schooling with extra tuition. In contrast, Bilalnagar has a 50 percent enrollment rate. The higher castes tend to send their children
to private schools at the primary level and then shift them to government schools. Thus, only those who cannot afford private schooling, for example, the lower castes, send their children to government primary schools (Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Caste and schooling choices: Chak 38/BC, Bahawalpur**

One of the Mirzada and Masih households appear to show signs of upward social mobility and have followed the pattern of high-caste households in sending their children to private schools. The Masih, however, have their own missionary-run private schools, which provide support in the form of tuition fees, uniforms, and books. One of the Masih households reported sending its children to a private high school.

5.3. Chakwal

The village of Jhatla is located in Talagang tehsil in Chakwal, northern Punjab. Chakwal and its surrounding districts have among the highest concentration of public and private schools in Punjab, with a private school participation rate of 22.7 percent and a public school participation rate of 50.8 percent for students aged 11–15 (Raju & Nguyen, 2014).

Chakwal’s hilly terrain makes it unsuitable for large-scale canal-fed agriculture, unlike Faisalabad and Bahawalpur. The limited availability of freshwater supplies means that the local population depends on rain-fed agriculture. Peanuts are the area’s staple crop, although corn and wheat are also cultivated. Chakwal and the surrounding districts in northern
Punjab have, historically, been sources of army recruitment dating from the British colonial period. An army job, no matter how minor, is still viewed as a source of prestige and economic stability.

5.3.1. Village Location and Resources

Jhatla has a population of approximately 14,000 inhabitants, roughly similar to Chak 38/BC in Bahawalpur. The village has easy access to the main road leading to the nearby town of Talagang. Most households have electricity, but the village has no gas facilities. As a result, households rely on gas cylinders and firewood. Given its proximity to urban Talagang and smaller landholdings, several village members have sought employment in the city. Migrating to the Middle East for work or joining the military is also common.

5.3.2. Caste Composition and Social Structures

The dominant higher caste in the village are the Awan, who comprise numerous subcastes such as the Malik, Wilayati, Bullhal, Nural, Magral, and Dilwal groups. Although traditionally landowners and agriculturalists, the division of inherited land has led the Awan into other occupations (Figure 5). Being Awan, however, is a strong identity marker of high caste.

![Figure 5: Caste and occupation: Jhatla, Chakwal](chart.png)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khokhar</td>
<td>Skilled labor</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awan</td>
<td>Skilled labor</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mochi</td>
<td>Skilled labor</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumhar</td>
<td>Skilled labor</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awan</td>
<td>Cultivation</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syed</td>
<td>Cultivation</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awan</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machhi</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machhi</td>
<td>Business</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awan</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Skilled labor
2. Unskilled labor
3. Cultivation
4. Services
5. Unemployed
6. Business
Other landowners are the Mochi caste: historically associated with the leather tanning trade, they are now involved in a wide range of occupations and have, over time, acquired agricultural land in Jhatla. The majority live in their own neighborhood in the village, known as “Mochi Mohalla,” which is adjacent to the main Awan settlement in the center of the village. However, many Mochi households claim to be Awan, despite living in the Mochi neighborhood and being identified by other villagers as Mochi.

The Sheikh caste form the village’s merchant and business community and own most of the shops in the main marketplace. Although not agricultural landowners, the Sheikh are relatively prosperous.

The poorest lower castes in the village are the Machhi, Khokhar (Muslim Sheikh), Kumhar, Ansari, and Mirasi. None of these groups engage exclusively in the occupation associated with their caste. Although none of them own any agricultural land, there are signs of upward mobility resulting from occupational change in several cases. One Kumhar household, for example, has a notably higher level of education as the head of the family has a job with the army, which has enabled them to buy a house and send their children to both private and public schools.

The Khokhar caste (referred to pejoratively by other villagers as the “Mussali”) are one of the poorest groups; they are spatially excluded and live on the periphery of the village in simple mud houses among other similarly positioned poor lower castes. The majority work as daily wage laborers or on contract on other people’s agricultural lands; women often work as domestic help.

5.3.3. Village Power Structures

Politically, the Awan are the dominant caste with members represented on the union council in Talagang. There is no formal panchayat structure in Jhatla, but like other villages, the high-caste Awan help resolve local disputes; the numberdar is also Awan. Some households report going to members of the local union council to settle their disputes or to the police, but this is only after all informal means of mediation have been exhausted. The lower castes have no part in resolving disputes. The Mochi, for instance, who have crossed class boundaries after acquiring land, are still denied political authority in the village.
5.3.4. Educational Opportunity

There are two public schools in Jhatla: a boys’ secondary school (until Grade 10) and a girls’ higher secondary school (until Grade 12). There are also over eight private schools located throughout the village that offer classes until Grade 8. All the private schools are coeducational. Despite being very conservative, however, Jhatla has a high female enrollment rate at the primary and secondary levels. The government schools have the highest enrollment rate. While private school tuition fees range from PRs 200 to 500, the government school fees are the same as in Bahawalpur and Faisalabad (PRs 20 and PRs 30 a month with an examination fee of PRs 250, payable occasionally). Textbooks are, likewise, free.

The private schools tend to be small and are typically housed in small residential buildings. In some cases, their teachers have only completed secondary school. In contrast, the two public schools for girls and boys are located at the main entrance to the village, are large and well maintained, and staffed by better-qualified teachers. Unlike the other two case study villages, the perceived difference between the quality of education between private and public schools is far less clear-cut, with the higher castes also sending their children to public schools. There is also strong demand for better education and a sense of holding schools accountable for their performance.

Jhatla has a large number of school-going children from all caste groups (Figure 6). Even the poorest and most marginalized report sending their children to public schools, although there are numerous instances of dropping out of school, especially among low-caste (for example, Mochi and Khokhar) girls. The main reason cited for this is poverty. The prosperous high-caste Awan actively participate in their children’s schooling and report meeting their children’s teachers on a regular basis. Most private school teachers are from the Awan caste.
Several of the Awan and Mochi households typically send their children to private schools at the primary level and then shift them to government schools. Nevertheless, in the absence of any secondary private schools in Jhatla, residents have little choice but to send their children to the two main public schools.

6. Results: Socially Excluded Groups and Access to Educational Opportunity

The data reveals that the menial labor castes are the most socially excluded in terms of landlessness and income poverty. We find that socially excluded castes live in impoverished, segregated neighborhoods with poor sanitation. Although they have access to healthcare facilities in all three villages, these groups have few options beyond the basic services offered. In contrast, the higher castes rarely use their local health facilities because they have wider access to better healthcare in the city.

There is no caste-based exclusion or discrimination where access to resources such as gas and electricity is concerned. However, in all three cases, landownership is directly linked to having a voice in the village and being (locally) politically empowered. None of the lower castes are represented in any political institution. The example of the small Awan caste is relevant here: as the largest landowners in Jhatla, Chakwal, they have remained influential despite facing strong opposition because of
their affiliation with the Shia sect. Small landownership, however, is not 

enough to overcome language-based exclusion, as the case of Punjabi-

versus-Seraiki speakers in Chak 38/BC (Bahawalpur) shows.

6.1. Passive Exclusion of Lower Castes from Education

While all three villages offer private and public schooling, the availability 
of schools does not ensure that everyone in the village has equal access 
to education. This section describes the subtle forms of exclusion that 
prevail.

6.1.1. Poverty and Spatial Exclusion

The private schools in these villages appear to epitomize the distinction 
between “haves” and “have-nots.” While all the survey participants 
perceive private schooling as being superior, the menial castes are, in 
most cases, excluded from the opportunity to attend private schools 
because they are difficult to afford. Private school tuition fees may be low 
by urban standards, but they are often too high for menial labor castes, 
which almost always have large families and meager incomes.

This subtle deselection by schools sets off “passive processes of exclusion” 
(Sen, 2000) from the space of private education, limiting lower-caste 
children’s opportunity for, and access to, education. In contrast, the higher 
castes have not only the freedom of such choice, but also the wider 
opportunity to send their children to better schools in the city.

Poverty also leads to the lower castes being passively excluded from the 
space of government schooling. Although government schools charge a 
nominal tuition fee, parents still need to meet expenses such as the cost 
of uniforms, schoolbags, and stationery, apart from other funds requested 
by the school, e.g., computer and exam fees. In addition, there is the loss 
of wages to be considered, that is, the opportunity cost of sending a child 
to school or to work.

The more spatially segregated, stigmatized castes, such as the nomadic 
Qalandar in Faisalabad, are treated virtually as untouchables. As “the 
object of gaze” (Whitley, 2005) because of their extreme poverty, 
mixing with the Qalandar or sitting at the same level as them is seen as 
a major and unimaginable cultural transgression. Since most of the 
schools in these villages are in high-caste settlements, lower castes would
have to “cross the boundaries” of their own settlement to send their children to school. This may deter them from enrolling their children in school altogether (Jacoby & Mansuri, 2011).

6.1.2. Temporal Exclusion

The temporal space within which education is provided has also led to the passive exclusion of the menial labor castes. Being poor and receiving little exchange value for their labor, it is a matter of survival for large low-caste families that everyone, including their children, should work during the day. Standard school hours for the lower and higher castes then do not translate into equal education opportunity for all. The menial castes have little freedom to invest in their children’s schooling in the hope of a future return if it means taking away from crucial time spent on labor that is necessary to survive in the immediate term.

In addition, the lower castes in Bahawalpur and Faisalabad report that the need for children’s labor in the harvest season forces them to withdraw their children from school for two to three weeks. This prolonged absence can result in expulsion and schools may even refuse to readmit these children. Thus, the standard school timetable is better suited to the lives of the higher castes while remaining indifferent to the needs of the lower castes.

In the face of these passive processes of exclusion, the lower castes seem to “choose” not to go to school. Yet, it is when we take the choice-making process into account (Sen, 2000) that their marginalization begins to emerge. This supports Bourdieu and Waquant’s (1992) argument that schools work to the advantage of the privileged dominant rather than offering equal opportunity to all—eventually forcing the dominated into exclusion.

6.2. Active Processes of Social Exclusion: Academic Labeling

The exclusion of the menial castes from private schooling has led to the de facto social segregation of low-caste children in primary government schools. Such segregation translates into “passive” and “active” forms of social exclusion (Sen, 2000) from learning opportunities. This becomes obvious when we consider that the consensus among the village population in all three cases is that government schools offer poor-quality primary education. This is despite the fact that teachers in the government schools are better qualified and generally better paid than those working in the private schools. It is here that participants report teacher
absenteeism, teachers’ indifference toward their students, and poor teaching and learning outcomes.

A key finding that supports this argument is that perceptions of the quality of government schools improve significantly Grade 6 onward when high-caste children enter the government school system because there are fewer secondary private schools. It is significant that, in Faisalabad, where private schools offer higher levels of education, the condition of the government schools is not reported to improve.

Teachers in government schools play an active exclusionary role by labeling low-caste children as unintelligent and uneducable. Our findings reveal that such academic labeling can lead parents to discontinue their child’s education. Low-caste parents also report that severe corporal punishment is often meted out to their children.

This confirms other findings in the literature that schools tend to discriminate against and label as failures those groups that are stigmatized in wider social life. This can make them believe that they are “naturally” unfit for education, leading to their “elimination” from education altogether (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). The social categories that operate outside schools thus infiltrate the classrooms, disguised as academic judgments.

6.3. Unfavorable Inclusion: The Bonding Capital of the Lower Castes

Unfavorable inclusion, in terms of group membership that requires adherence to certain cultural norms, has severely limited opportunities for education among the poorest menial castes in Bahawalpur and Faisalabad. For example, the Qalandar in Faisalabad, who are stigmatized and spatially excluded, do not send their children to school as a binding group norm. Caste members observe these norms rigidly to mark the difference between themselves and others as a mark of “bonding” with the group, once they have accepted their lower position in the social hierarchy. Similarly, the Taheem and Jam in Bahawalpur express their fear of informal group sanctions as “What would people say?”, which keeps them from sending their children to school.

This “self-deselection” is explained by Bourdieu (1993) as the loss of hope and the naturalized acceptance of inequitable social structures. The threat of exclusion from group membership is real for individuals if they already belong to a group that has been excluded by the wider society. Faced with
the multiple problems of survival and poverty, group support is pivotal. This “unfavorable inclusion” (Sen, 2000) restricts the educational opportunities available to such individuals; it also deepens the group’s social exclusion by drawing it into an “ethnic enclave” (Xie & Gough, 2011) and foreclosing the wider social participatory opportunities available.

6.4. Educational Choices: Bonding vs. Bridging Capital

While the capability approach perspective explains the prevalent social exclusionary processes, it is Bourdieu’s theoretical concept of social capital that provides insights into the mechanism and causes of caste-based social exclusion and its impact on education. The bonding capital of the higher castes in all three villages compels their members to adhere to the norm of sending their children to school. Once educating children becomes a “legitimate” practice in enacting group membership, education itself acquires a symbolic value. The emphasis is on ensuring that the best possible educational opportunities are available to the group’s children to highlight its relative “distinction” (Bourdieu, 1986). Education is then pursued almost as a tool, a ritual such as property rights or endogamy, to reaffirm the boundaries of the group and retain its privilege by responding positively to changing market forces, where education is now important.

The same bonding capital in the most socially excluded groups—especially those that are spatially segregated, such as the Qalandar in Faisalabad and the Taheem and Jam in Bahawalpur—manifests itself in the “unfavorable inclusion” of individuals and enforces the opposing norm of self-deselection from education. This implies rejecting the norms of the dominant group and accepting their own marginalized intergenerational position. The Taheem and Jam also explain such norms in terms of informal sanctions within their caste groups against sending children, especially girls, to school.

Where the bonding capital of the lower castes has weakened due to changes in their economic circumstances—for example, in the case of the Mirzada and Jam households mentioned earlier—it has been replaced by bridging capital. Thus, among the heterogeneous population of Basti Bilalnagar, these households were able to deviate from group norms and send their children to school. However, such schooling choices are still constrained by the poverty of the household.
The bridging capital across high- and low-caste groups has led the latter to accept the norms of the former and value education. Thus, they have attempted to send their children to school even when constrained by low incomes. This bridging capital may also have played a role in increasing the flow of information concerning market structures and enabled the lower castes to conceptualize opportunities for upward mobility through education. For example, all the lower castes that live alongside the powerful Jatt in the Old Chak (Bahawalpur) send their children to school; only a few low-caste households in Bilalnagar that perceive having broken away from the influential Jatt in the Old Chak send their children to school.

In Bilalnagar, resisting the dominance of the Jatt also means rejecting their values. However, this can depend on the nature of the bridging capital across castes within Bilalnagar and on their economic mobility, which would determine whether lower castes enroll their children in school. Although there are some high-caste households living here, most are relatively poor. This means there is little encouragement to be gained from their example where schooling decisions are concerned. The enrollment rate, therefore, has remained low.

Nevertheless, upward social mobility is always associated with following the norms of the higher castes in sending children to school. For example, the Mirzada and Masih both in Faisalabad and Bahawalpur appear to have benefited from bonding as well as bridging capital, as reflected in their decision to send their children to school. The Masih also seem to have benefited from bonding capital and been able to expand their social capital through exogamy and access to wider social networks.

There is also strong evidence of bridging capital in Jhatla, where almost all households report sending their children to school. This bridging capital is affected both by smaller landholdings and market structure: smaller landholdings imply that almost everyone has to seek other opportunities to make a living. It also means that the lower castes are less economically dependent on the higher castes. In addition, all the castes clearly recognize the value of education in the form of the opportunity structure offered by the market. For example, seeking a job with the army (which has become a tradition over time) or overseas employment both correspond to the level of education provided in the village.
7. Concluding Discussion

The study’s findings reveal that caste in rural settings intersects with educational opportunity in complex and subtle ways. Indirectly, it helps generate and sustain horizontal poverty by naturalizing given social positions. Caste titles invoke the collective memory of a historical hierarchy of the division of labor and social structures. They also generate and maintain exclusive networks to guard the “distinction” of landowners (Bourdieu, 1993) even when class boundaries have been surpassed. Hence, caste titles disguise otherwise erodible class-based boundaries.

The ascribed status of caste is an attempt to ensure social closure, creating poverty traps for the lower castes. Thus, in Basti Bilalnagar, the Mirzada have had to disassociate themselves from their caste and claim to be Chughtai to gain respect. The Mochi have had to claim to be Awan to acquire the social status that even their social mobility could not secure. In contrast, the Rajput enjoy the status of a landowning caste (and the respect associated with it) even though they no longer have any lands.

The poverty resulting from caste-based structures restricts the access of the lower castes to educational opportunity, setting off “active” and “passive” exclusionary processes as well as through “unfavorable inclusion” as Sen (2000) suggests. The exclusionary processes that operate in schools reflect the struggle for power and “distinction” across caste groups in the wider social structures. Schooling provision itself emerges as inequitable and more suited to the needs of higher castes than responsive to the issues that debar lower castes from education (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).

The active processes of exclusion within schools in the form of academic labeling conceal a social caste-based categorization to which teachers are not immune. The segregation of low-caste children in primary government school classes is a microcosm of the rejection of lower castes in wider society, while the provision of education remains far from equal (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).

Applying the capability approach reveals that merely providing schools does not enable more equal access to education because of the difference in individual social contexts. Thus, it is important to take into account how choices are made rather than accounting for the choice itself. The
schooling choices of those similarly positioned in terms of caste and class match, as suggested by Bourdieu (1993), because of their inter-caste bonding capital. While this bonding capital gives higher castes the advantage, it also sets off “unfavorable” inclusionary processes among the poorest and most stigmatized castes, leading them to reject education in order to legitimize their group membership (Bourdieu, 1986).

In cases where the economic position of a low-caste group has changed, they have distanced themselves from their low-caste roots by self-identifying as a different caste and following high-caste norms with respect to education. Where the bridging capital was important, education was clearly valued and recognized as instrumental in equalizing opportunities. Education thus becomes a site of struggle, a “symbolic practice” or means to maintain or gain distinction.

While the lower castes strive for a greater share of opportunity and more control over their lives (than they have had historically) by enrolling their children in school, the higher castes move to retain the exclusivity of their privileges in three ways:

- By sending their children to schools that “others” cannot afford, for example, private schools in the village or city
- By inflating their education credentials and, within schools, meting out differential treatment to lower castes, forcing them to see that they are “naturally” incompetent (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977)
- By simply ignoring the diverse needs of low-caste children in the design of schooling provision.

In the presence of bridging capital, school distance is less of an issue, but where there is little bridging capital—as evident in the spatial segregation of lower castes such as the Qalandar or in Bilalnagar as a whole—school distance emerges as a key challenge. The lack of bridging capital between high-caste teachers and first-generation low-caste students might also explain why the latter’s different learning needs are “misrecognized” (Bourdieu, 1993) as poor intelligence.

While the findings of this study are not generalizable, given its nature, it does contribute to the existing literature by highlighting an important but under-explored area in educational research.
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